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1.  Introduction 
We are pleased to respond to two waste policy consultations: first, the 
reopening of that on the proposed Section 60 Policy Direction on a proposed cap to 
incineration capacity as a proportion of municipal solid waste arisings (“MSW”) and 
other matters (“the proposed Section 60 policy direction”);1 and, second, on the new 
Draft Statement on Waste Policy (“the Draft Waste Statement”).2  The proposals 
subject to consultation, together with a number of other recent waste management 
proposals,3 mark a radical departure in the direction of waste policy in Ireland.  This 
change is presaged in the opening paragraph of the Draft Waste Statement:  
This draft policy statement for consultation outlined the key principles 
and actions which it is envisaged will inform Irish waste policy for the 
coming decade and beyond.  Its core objective is to put sustainability 
at the core of Ireland’s resource and waste management policy.  It 
presents a paradigm shift in the approach to waste management in 
Ireland towards resource management with significant potential to add 
value and create jobs in the economy.  Using all appropriate legislative 
and fiscal measures, our aim is to move away from the traditional 
landfill and mass burn incineration, towards higher levels of recycling 
and mechanical/biological treatment [“MBT”].  Solid recovered fuel 
produced through such treatment methods can be used to displace 
fossil fuels, thereby reducing greenhouse gas emissions and supporting 
Ireland’s contribution to the global efforts to address the very 
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 The consultation for this closed, after being extended, on 31 July 2009.  None of the submissions to 
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significant and pressing challenge of climate change (DoEHLG, 2010, 
p. 3).  
The proposed Section 60 policy direction is complementary to the Draft Waste 
Statement since it places a cap, which can be either national or regional, on the 
aggregate capacity of licensed incinerators as a proportion of MSW – initially 30% 
and then from 2015, 25%.  Current waste management policy does not place limits on 
the capacity of incineration, nor does it favour MBT as the preferred method of MSW 
treatment.   
 Two reports by Eunomia underpin the proposals in the proposed Section 60 
policy direction and the Draft Waste Statement.  First, Eunomia (2009) conducted a 
Strategic Environmental Assessment (“SEA”) of the proposals to cap incineration and 
increase recycling rates to 70% of MSW, consistent with the 30% cap on incineration.  
Gorecki, et al (2010, pp. 42-51) raised concerns, inter alia, over the SEA and the 
proposed Section 60 policy direction:4 
• The SEA approach is seriously flawed because it only considered the benefits 
of moving from policy A to policy B and paid no attention to the associated 
costs.  A Regulatory Impact Analysis, which addresses both costs and 
benefits and is a vital part of the government’s Better Regulation agenda, 
would have been a more appropriate  methodology to employ; 
• The 70% recycling target is based on the assumption that Ireland can meet 
the highest recycling rate of an EU Member State for each material – from 
glass to textiles – but no policy is put forward as to how the target will be 
met (a point made by Eunomia) nor are the costs of reaching the target 
estimated; and, 
• The 30% cap on incineration is arbitrary and is not justified by reference to 
any economic or environmental studies or reasoning. 
The SEA conducted by Eunomia is the document subject to present consultation by 
the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government (“DoEHLG”).  
It is unchanged from the document circulated as part of the previous consultation in 
summer 2009.   
Second, subsequently an international consortium, led by Eunomia, conducted an 
international review of waste management policy for the DoEHLG (Eunomia et al, 
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2009).  The international review was designed to deliver a new waste management 
policy for Ireland.  It contained twenty-four recommendations.5  These were wide 
ranging, touching on virtually all aspects of waste policy.  Greater source separation 
by households was recommended.  A series of targets were set for recycling and 
residual household waste.  A levy structure based on pricing unpriced externalities 
(e.g. greenhouse gases, local disamenities such as odour, congestion and noise) was 
proposed for residual waste which would vary by disposal method (i.e. landfill, 
incineration, MBT) the income from which, it was recommended, should be used to 
finance priority areas under the aegis of the Environmental Fund. The collection of 
household waste should be the responsibility of local authorities that would decide the 
most appropriate collection method model, with a preference for competition for the 
market (i.e. competitive tendering).  Finally, the ten regional waste management plans 
should be replaced by a single national waste plan, with ultimate responsibility resting 
with the Minister for the Environment, Heritage and Local Government. 
All but one of the twenty-four recommendations made by the international 
review – that concerned with the setting waste levies based on externalities - are 
reflected in the Draft Waste Statement either receiving explicit endorsement or, 
somewhat more tentatively, reference is made to considering the proposed 
recommendation.  Indeed in a small number of cases the recommendations have 
already been implemented, albeit in one case because of a European Court of Justice 
decision.6  For the remaining recommendations there is typically little or no 
discussion in the Draft Waste Statement surrounding the recommendation.  For 
example, the recycling targets for construction and demolition (“C&D”) in the Draft 
Waste Statement (DoEHLG, 2010, p. 20) are simply stated for 2010 (75%) to 2016 
(90%) drawn directly from Eumonia et al (2009, p. 43).  Hence in evaluating the 
merits of the proposals in the Draft Waste Statement recourse is, of necessity, made to 
the international review. 
Gorecki et al (2010, pp.  52-104) review and comment on the international 
review, paying particular attention to the recommendations.  In many instances the 
recommendations make good sense and should be supported.  The principle that waste 
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levies should be set on the basis of externalities is firmly grounded an economic 
approach to waste management.7  A sensible corollary of waste levies is recognised 
by the international review when it argues that “it is not clear what is to be gained by 
Government stating a preference for one … [waste disposal technology] if the levy 
comes into force.”8  There is extensive evidence to support the recommendation that 
competition for the market in household waste collection will lead to lower costs than 
the current competition in the market arrangements.9  The idea of refundable 
compliance bonds to ensure compliance with C&D targets is a novel approach that 
merits serious consideration.  The recognition that in applying producer responsibility, 
producers are to be responsible for full financial responsibility for delivering the 
services required to meet their obligations is likely to make this a much more effective 
policy instrument.   
Nevertheless, there were a number of instances where difficulties concerning the 
recommendations in the international review were raised.  Ambitious targets for waste 
per inhabitant - declining from 250 kg in 2011 to 150kg in 2020 - are set and Ireland 
is to reach these levels much faster than in comparator jurisdictions. There is, 
however, no explanation as to how this target would be met, raising questions as to 
the credibility of the target.  Admittedly an enforcement mechanism is to be put in 
place to achieve these targets but it is vague and not clearly thought out.  Local 
authorities with levels of waste per inhabitant above their allowance would pay a fine 
to those whose waste fell below their allowance, but with no apparent methodology 
put forward that would take into account exogenous factors which might account for 
differences in waste per inhabitant such as household size, rural vs. urban, and so on; 
and with no regard for appropriate incentives to individual households and firms.  
Although we welcome the principle of setting levies based on externalities, there are 
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 There are however, differences as to the exactly how these externalities should be priced.  For details 
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below. 
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 This statement is not contained in the main body of the summary report of the international review, 
but in Annex 56, pp. 843-844. 
9
 There may be a concern that competitive tendering is inconsistent with the recent High Court Panda 
judgment which found that tendering breached competition law.  However, the High Court judgment 
characterised tendering as a situation where the winner of the tender acts as an unconstrained 
monopolist and charge accordingly.  However, under tendering as proposed here, the lowest priced bid 
would win the tender and charge that price not the monopoly price.  Hence the High Court judgment is 
of limited, if any, relevance in this regard.  For further discussion of the judgment see Andrews and 
Gorecki (2010). 
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serious grounds for disputing the estimates in the international review as being 
appropriate. 
The recommendation concerning centralisation of waste planning to the 
DoEHLG away from the current regional waste management plans receives scant 
justification in the international review. The only text surrounding this 
recommendation is the rather elliptical statement that where it makes sense local 
authorities should be encouraged to work together.  No reference is made to any of the 
65 annexes or the international experience to justify or inform the recommendation, 
nor co-ordination mechanisms that fall short of the centralisation of waste policy and 
its implementation in the hands of central government.  Gorecki et al (2010, p. 94) 
propose an alternative criteria for assigning responsibility by level of government, 
based on the principle of subsidiarity. 
There is little point in this submission in repeating the conclusions and 
discussions in Gorecki et al (2010)10 on the proposed Section 60 policy direction and 
the Draft Waste Statement.  Nothing has happened in the intervening months to cause 
any revision of the views expressed.  The above discussion gives a flavour of the 
concerns expressed with respect to these two sets of inter related proposals.  For 
reasons set out in Gorecki et al (2010), we have grave concerns about the cost and 
feasibility of the Draft Waste Statement’s aim to move away from landfill and 
incineration as waste disposal methods towards MBT and higher levels of recycling.  
Furthermore while the reliance on sustainability as the core objective sounds fine as a 
broad statement it would have been helpful if the Draft Waste Statement had put some 
flesh on the concept and how it might operationalised in an Irish waste setting.11 
In the remainder of this submission we address three issues.  First, in Section 2, 
some comments about the consultation process, in terms of its costs and the delay in 
taking policy forward.  Second, some further discussion of the one area where the 
Draft Waste Statement did not follow the recommendations of the international 
review, setting waste levies (Section 3).  Building on the discussion of the previous 
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 For example, the Draft Waste Statement could have drawn on the often cited definition contained in 
the Brundtland Report (1987, p. 43, emphasis in original): "Sustainable development is development 
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own needs. It contains within it two key concepts: the concept of needs, in particular the essential 
needs of the world's poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and, the idea of limitations 
imposed by the state of technology and social organization on the environment's ability to meet present 
and future needs." 
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two sections, the issue is raised of the degree to which policy making in the area of 
waste management is causing serious reputational damage to Ireland, with adverse 
consequences not only for waste (Section 4).  A brief conclusion completes the 
submission (Section 5). 
2.  Consultation: Right Questions? Right Procedure? Right Timing? Right 
Resolution?  
 Consultation is an essential part of developing and implementing policy.  
Government departments and regulatory agencies do not possess all the relevant 
expertise and knowledge concerning a particular area. Frequently there will be 
unintended consequences of a proposal that may be difficult for such institutions to 
identify, measure and remedy.12  People on the ground with practical experience or 
that look at policy proposals through a different lens, can make thus make an 
important contribution to the development of policy.  However, to optimise such 
consultation processes requires that the policy proposals are sufficiently precise that 
sensible comments can be made and that the proposals should take into account 
comments received.  Consultation processes are not, after all, costless.  Resources are 
expended in preparing responses as well as in writing the policy documents for 
consultation.  If those participating in the consultation come to the view that their 
comments and suggestions are not likely to be seriously considered then they may be 
reluctant to fully engage in policy formulation with adverse consequences for the 
quality of policy and ultimately the welfare of society.    
In some instances the waste proposals are insufficiently precise.  Earlier in 
2010 the DoEHLG conducted a consultation exercise on waste facility levies, with 
submissions to be received on or by 30 April 2010.13  A draft outline of the relevant 
sections of a Bill concerning such levies was distributed and comments requested.  
While the Bill set a limit for the levy for incineration of €120 per tonne with annual 
increments of up to €50 per tonne, the DoEHLG did not specify what the initial level 
of the levy would be or what increments would obtain for incineration.14  The waste 
facility levy is also to be volumetric; in other words, it will depend on the size of 
waste facility, so that, for example, for the first 100,000 tonnes might pay €25 per 
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 For example when household waste charges were introduced there was an increase in backyard 
burning, which led to a near tripling in hospital admissions for one hospital of patients setting 
themselves on fire burning waste.  For details see Levitt & Dubner (2009, p. 139). 
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 See http://www.environ.ie/en/Environment/Waste/WasteFacilityLevies/ for details of the 
consultation.  Accessed 16 September 2010. 
14
 The Bill also referred to landfill, but the schedule of levies applying to landfill has already been 
announced so most comment was concerned with the Bill’s impact on incineration. 
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tonne, the next €30 per tonne.  However, a supporting paper setting out details and 
justification for the proposals was not published.   
Instead reference is made to two studies.  However, this was of limited 
usefulness.  The international review’s recommendation that waste facility levies 
should be based on externalities was not considered appropriate so that study can be 
disregarded for the purposes of the consultation exercise.  The other study, 
APEnvEcon (2008)’s Regulatory Impact Analysis (“RIA”), which evaluated a range 
of landfill and incineration levies, does not provide any basis for the volumetric levy, 
while the maximum waste facility levy of €120 per tonne in the Bill is well above 
those proposed (for landfill, cap of €85 per tonne; for incineration, €45 per tonne).  
Furthermore, the terms of reference for the RIA conducted by APEnvEcon are flawed 
in that the limit, without justification, the range of levies that can be considered by the 
RIA specifying that “the landfill levy will not be altered in such a way as to give a 
competitive advantage to incineration” (ibid, p. 9).   
 Submissions have already been made to the DoEHLG on both the proposed 
Section 60 policy direction and the basis for the Draft Waste Statement, the 
international review, prior to the current consultation exercise.  In the case of the 
proposed Section 60 policy direction the original consultation deadline was extended 
in summer 2009 to facilitate completion of such submissions.  Submissions were also 
made in relation to the international review, which was published in November 2009, 
not only by Gorecki et al (2010), but also by other organisations such as Irish 
Business and Employers Confederation (“IBEC”).  However, none of these 
submissions are reflected in the two documents subject to the present consultation.  It 
is not clear why this is the case: the original consultation for the proposed Section 60 
policy direction closed in July 2009, while the international review was released in 
November 2009, leaving a year and six months, respectively, prior to the start of the 
current consultation.   
The net effect of the various waste consultations is that policy development is 
slowed and that resources are needlessly consumed commenting on the same 
document more than once for no apparent reason. There is no apparent engagement or 
willingness to consider submissions made to the DoEHLG, and the proposals 
themselves are sometimes too vague to facilitate useful comment.  It is not at all 
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obvious such an approach to consultation is in accordance with the Better Regulation 
agenda.15    
3.  Waste Levies & Quantitative Limits or Caps 
 In Gorecki et al (2010) it is argued that waste levies should reflect unpriced 
externalities (e.g. greenhouse gases, contamination of groundwater, local 
disamenities) and, further, that quantitative limits or caps should not also imposed on 
particular forms of waste disposal such as incineration or MBT.  This approach was 
justified on the grounds that these externalities were not at present taken into account 
by operators of waste facilities and that once the appropriate levy is set, then it should 
be up to suppliers of waste services combined with designers of Regional Waste 
Management Plans to select the best most appropriate mix of waste disposal methods, 
which is likely to vary by region depending on their demographic, spatial and 
economic characteristics.  It was further argued that the levies should not be imposed 
on facilities such as cement plants already subject to IPPC licensing, since these 
emissions are already regulated.  Double regulation is not normally considered to be 
best practice.   Although not entirely in agreement, the international review’s findings 
were consistent with the view that levies should reflect externalities and that caps are 
inappropriate. 
 The proposed Section 60 policy direction and the Draft Waste Statement are 
completely at variance with these proposals.  Section 60 sets a proposed cap on 
incineration.  Externality based pricing is to be addressed “in the broader context of 
air quality controls” (DoEHLG, 2010, p. 18) thus raising the possibility of double 
regulation.  Waste levies are to be set in such a way for landfill that does not give 
incineration a competitive advantage.  The waste levy structure has still to be 
finalised: for landfill it will rise to €75 per tonne in 2012; for MBT zero per tonne 
until at least 2014 when it will be reviewed;16 and, for incineration no decision has yet 
been announced, despite the consultation exercise noted above, but it is likely to be 
volumetric. Compared with the externality based pricing advocated by Gorecki et al 
(2010), the landfill price is too high and the MBT is too low, while if there is a 
regional cap of 30% on the share of incineration in accounting for municipal waste, 
then the implied price for incinerators above the cap will be too high – in effect 
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 The consultation guidelines are set out in Department of the Taoiseach (2005).  Consultation is 
defined as “a structured public engagement which involves seeking, receiving, analysing and 
responding to feedback from stakeholders” (ibid., p.3). 
16
 As set out in DoEHLG (2010, p. 18). 
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infinity since the plant would breach the cap and hence not be built and/or closed 
down.17 
 What drives the structure of waste levies and the cap in incineration is a clear 
policy preference for some forms of waste disposal – MBT – over others – landfill 
and incineration, particularly larger incinerators.  However, the policy preference goes 
well beyond what would be justified on the basis of externalities.  Furthermore, other 
proposed waste policies also appear to be aimed towards disadvantaging incineration, 
such as the banning of take-or-pay contracts,18 with the volumetric pricing for 
incineration resulting in both greater inefficiency and larger externalities.19 Thus there 
needs to be a clear articulation as to why there is a strong policy preference against 
incineration and in favour of MBT and why there is a need to employ so many policy 
instruments to achieve that objective.  This is not just double, but triple regulation.  As 
yet, this justification has not been forthcoming.20     
4.   Policy Stability & Reputational Damage 
Firms making investment in long-lived infrastructure value policy certainty, 
whether it is building waste facilities or some other area where government plays an 
important role in setting the economic and regulatory framework within which such 
decisions are made.  Certainty means that firms can plan with a reasonable degree of 
assurance.  This is important, especially for projects with a long-life span – measured 
in decades, rather than years – and with a substantial element of sunk or irrecoverable 
capital.  Waste treatment facilities fall into this category in differing degrees.  Various 
contractual devices have been introduced to minimise the risk in investing in such 
projects, such as put-or-pay contracts.21  If, however, there is policy uncertainty 
and/or these risk-reducing contractual arrangements cannot be utilised, then investors 
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 Gorecki & Lyons (2010, Table 4, p. 1) present the levy schedule: landfill, €44.50 to €55.10; urban 
incineration, €9.80-€10.70; MBT, €0.90 - €1.50.  Gorecki et al (2010) demonstrate that a regional cap 
of 30% would mean that the proposed incinerator for the Dublin region at Poolbeg would exceed this 
threshold. 
18
 This is discussed further in Gorecki et al (2010). 
19
 Assuming that two small incinerators are built instead of one with the same capacity then the two 
smaller ones are likely to be less efficient than the larger incinerator, while to the extent that local 
disamenity effects – noise, congestion and smell – are related to the existence of an incinerator rather 
than its size, will mean that externalities will be higher with two small compared to one large 
incinerator. 
20
 It is true that doubts have been raised as to whether sufficient waste will be available for the Poolbeg 
plant and that there may be competition concerns.  However, Gorecki & Lyons (2010) cast doubt on 
the validity of the first issue, while the Competition Authority has largely dismissed the competition 
concerns that have been raised, although one issue is still under investigation.  See Competition (2010) 
where the full text of the Authority’s reasoning is set out. 
21
 The economics of such contracts is discussed in Gorecki et al (2010). 
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will either not invest in such projects or demand a higher rate of return reflecting the 
greater risk.  In either case, the costs of providing waste facilities will increase and be 
borne by Irish society.  This does not mean, of course, that policy cannot change 
provided that a well articulated case is made for such a change, based on new 
evidence or a change in circumstances; and provided that policy is changed following 
the applicable procedures (including meaningful consultation; see above).  However, 
that may mean that some sort of payment may be necessary for stranded assets that 
are no longer required due to the policy change. 
The burden of the previous two sections is that the proposed changes in waste 
policy are creating considerable added uncertainty.  Consultations are held on vague 
proposals for waste levies, especially those relating to incineration, with little if any 
supporting documentation that provides a coherent rationale.  Consultations are held 
on exactly the same document twice, a year apart, despite the extensive submissions 
the first time.  A Draft Waste Statement is circulated for comment, but not reflecting 
or answering any of the comments or criticisms that were made on the report from 
which the recommendation in the Draft Waste Statement were taken, virtually 
verbatim, with no additional explanation.  Any investor in landfill and MBT has 
reasonable certainty as to the scale of waste levies, but an investor in an incinerator 
has no sense as to what the levies it faces might be except that they are likely to be 
high and increase a substantial rate.  Indeed, such an investor also faces uncertainty as 
to whether or not take or pay contracts will be abolished and a cap (regional or 
national) will be placed on incineration capacity.   
 This behaviour is likely to raise costs of investing in waste facilities in Ireland 
because of the increased uncertainty.  Lest there be any doubt that increased 
uncertainty raises costs, one only has to observe events as this submission is being 
prepared.  There is considerable doubt as to the final cost of Anglo-Irish Bank to the 
Irish taxpayer, with estimates varying between €25 and €35 billion.  This uncertainty, 
together with other factors, is increasing the borrowing costs when Ireland goes to the 
international money markets to fund the budget deficit.   
It could, of course, be argued that much of the uncertainty in the waste area is 
limited to only one form of waste disposal, incineration.  However, this would be a 
misleading characterisation.  Incinerators currently being built or in planning account 
for a substantial portion of the waste that it is anticipated to be disposed in the next 10 
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to 15 years.22  If the incinerators are not to be built then that is clearly a signal that 
alternative forms of waste disposal, primarily MBT, should be built.  However, the 
investors in such plants cannot be certain that these incinerators will not be built and 
compete with them for the available waste.  Given this uncertainty they are likely to 
demand a higher rate of return to compensate for this additional risk or perhaps not 
build as many MBT plants.  Hence there may well not be enough alternative capacity 
built for Ireland to meet its landfill targets under the Landfill Directive for 2013 and 
2016.  As a result not only will Ireland likely have to pay fines for not meeting the 
Landfill Directive targets, but extensive recourse will have to be made to the most 
environmentally damaging form of waste disposal, landfill. 
Furthermore the impact of the uncertainty created in the waste area is likely to 
have repercussions in other sectors of the economy where large infrastructure projects 
with a high component of sunk costs are being considered.  After all these policies are 
part and parcel not only of the DoEHLG policy statements, but also embodied in the 
Programme for Government, which has the support of government as a whole. If one 
minister is seen to change policy in an arbitrary manner without regard for the 
appropriate procedures, then it is reasonable to expect that other ministers may act in 
the same way.  
5. Conclusion 
 Waste policy development in Ireland is essentially on hold.  In the past three 
years there have been a number of consultations, but, by and large, no definitive 
decisions by government. The development of waste policy in Ireland appears to have 
imposed costs with no discernable benefits in terms of policy development.  It is a 
case study in how not to go about consultation.  Instead of being driven by a desire to 
set and meet environmental goals in a cost-effective manner, the proposals are to a 
considerable extent based on a predetermined view that incineration, especially large 
incinerators, should be discouraged but with no coherent economic or environmental 
rationale as to why policy should have as its goal this technology-specific bias.  It is 
not supported by the government’s own international review. 
  Submissions received by the DoEHLG in this area have neither been 
published nor responded to, even where there has been ample opportunity and time to 
do so.  There is no sign that this paralysis will come to an end shortly.  The Draft 
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 See Gorecki et al (2010) for details. 
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Waste Statement promises that there will be an RIA undertaken as part of “further 
significant consultation and engagement” (DoEHLG, 2010, p. 4).  This is likely to 
defer any decisions until 2011 and beyond.  The reputational damage to Ireland, 
which is likely to spread to sectors of the economy beyond waste, as well as the likely 
failure to reach landfill targets in 2013 and 2016, is something that should not be 
contemplated lightly.  It is somewhat ironic that a Draft Waste Statement that talks 
about sustainability and moving away from landfill may well end producing a less 
sustainable policy and more extensive use of landfill than anticipated.  It is one of 
those unintended consequences referred to above.   
1 October 2010 
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